The global terrorism practiced by al-Qaeda has no easily recognizable targets – the Danish embassy in Pakistan, a nightclub in Bali, suburban trains in London and Madrid, a synagogue in Tunisia, a Sauerland – Cell in Germany. This affects not only public order and citizen of a country but also companies, agencies and organizations that send employees into crisis areas or also economically active at such places.
The violence is directed against targets with high symbolic content, such as religious places, monuments, commercial and banking centers, police and military facilities or government and parliament buildings. Also, an increase of attacks on soft targets such as public transport, restaurants, cafes, nightclubs or marketplaces is observed. As another strategic motive of terrorist activities and rising are the acquisition and mobilization of sympathizers and supporters, as well as the radicalization of politically related movements.
It must be made clear that today anyone can be taken in principle, any person in any place at any time.
Due to the current generation change in its leadership structure, the re-increasing terrorist organization al-Qaeda becomes more frequent access onto young violent Muslims. Such people plan and organize their activities largely independently. It must be expected that there will be soon greater attacks with more victims. The relative high proportion of young poeple who are traveling into Pakistan or several regions in Africa to be trained at terror camps must be seen as clear warning signs.
Al-Qaeda has not been defeated by military action or has been weakened in its capacity to act danger. There is no clear determination of the terror network or proofed evidence about its executive Organization. The leadership of the group remains still active and at large. Al-Qaeda has managed to turn Iraq into a global model for terrorism and insurgency, has successfully shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan and Western Pakistan and gained strength in North Africa, also in Somalia and Yemen. Also, al-Qaeda has managed to inspire radical young Muslims continue their engagement. The use of suicide bombers still remains their most effective weapon.
Is the organization stronger today than nine years ago and now also a potential threat for India?
Yes, in any case. They are highly motivated and stable while distributing their ideology and messages using among other publishing media the Internet, Twitter and Facebook. Muslims in all countries of the world – also in India – are called up to organize themselves and join the fight of the radical Islamic terrorism. It is not yet managed to find an answer to the question of how combat this high motivation. Al-Qaeda could, either directly or with the help of its allies, repeat the attacks of 11 September 2001 at any time – even with greater effect and extent.
The renewal of al-Qaeda shows that they also use their means to secure their own economic base. This comes along with a wide range of criminal activities depending not primarily to political objectives but serve the procurement of their cash flow. The methods already became forms of organized crime. They range from smuggling, production and distribution of counterfeit currency up to drug trafficking. The most particularly evident can be seen by the example of Afghanistan, which handles meanwhile up to 80% of the world opium market. Taliban and al-Qaida thus have installed a lucrative financial business at place to meet their own needs.
Meanwhile, India is playing an important role in this cycle also. The country increasingly became a hub for the logistical support of terrorist networks within the Asian region. A special feature is the structuring of transit routes on the north-south or east-west axis by al-Qaeda supporters. Here, the transport of personnel, weapons, money, explosives and other material by car, bus or train is going to be organized.
The current strategy of the “global war on terror” is largely based on operational defense, i.e., “killing, trapping, and thwarting attacks. Groups like al-Qaeda can quickly recover from such activities, compensate their human and material losses – and fight back.
Through improved intelligence work and better operational capacities it is possible to attack supporters as well as terrorist groups in their infrastructure. If this ultimately resolves the problem remains questionable.
That biggest obstacle in the fight against terrorism is that no authority and no state are able to be prepared for all scenarios. The question remains, what can be addressed to the future handling this potential hazard. How should the strategic thinking be focused? What must be designed in view of the educational profile of this entirely new form of threat? What competencies must be present? How big is the difference between theory and practice in their daily work? These questions should be answered also by Indian authorities within the very next future.
Peter Schoor, Februar 2010